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NOTE AND COMMENT
SIMPLIFICATION OF JUDICIAL PRoc£Duro: IN Ff:D£RAL CoUR'tS.-In 1914 the.
Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives unanimously reported favorably upon a bill (H. R. 133) authorizing the Supreme Court of
the United States to prescribe by rule the forms, kind and character of
the entire pleading, practice and procedure to be used in all actions and
proceedings at law in the federal courts, with a view to their '5implification,
which rules should, when promulgated, take precedence of any law in conflict therewith. On January 2, 1917, a similar bill (S. 4551) was favorably
reported from the Senate Judiciary Committee by a distinguished graduate
of this Law School, Senator SuTHaLAND. The concurrence of the Judiciary
Committees of the two houses of Congress gives promise of an early enactment of this legislation.
While many other activities of Congress have attracted more attention
than this effort to promote uniformity in federal court procedure, it is
doubtful whether any will have more far-reaching beneficent consequences.
The purpose of the so-called ''UNIFORMITY Ac:r" of 1872 (R. S. 9I4), was
to save the bar from the double burden of two systems of procedure in law
cases, one State and the other federal. Such an eventuality was one which
the profession might well hope to escape. But in practice it was found that
real uniformity was impossible. The loophole provided by the language
"as near as may be" was more and more resorted to by the federal courts
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to avoid conformity with local rules of practice which did not seem just
and reasonable, with the result that an immense number of precedents for
non-conformity have been established, destroying to a large extent the very
uniformity in procedure which it was the purpose of the Ar:r to establish.
On the surface, the proposed regulation of federal procedure by the Supreme Court aims only to recognize the actual divergence between State and
federal practice and to improve the latter in a systematic fashion. This
would be a great gain in itself, for the present hybrid practice in the federal
courts is intrinsica11y unsatisfactory' and ·creates confusion as between the
various federal districts.
But the real effect of a uniform system of federal practice would almost
certainly be far greater than this. The States have been groping about
more or less blindly for seventy years trying to reform procedure. The
early promise of the Fmr.n Cons has not been fu1fi11ed. The ".Cons" is in
large measure a failure. Statutory modifications of the common law system have been tried again and again with indifferent success. They alt
failed in the most vital place,-they were fixed and mandatory legislative
enactments imposed upon the courts, instead of rules •by which the courts
guided their own efforts to do justice to litigants. In a few conspicuous instances, such as New Jersey in 1912, Colora.do in 1913, and Virginia in 1916,
the States themselves have taken up the court-rule system of procedure,
but progress has been exceedingly slow.
If, now, the Congress of the United States approves the court-rule plan,
and it is put into effect with the wisdom and ability which we have the
right to expect from the United States Supreme Court, the movement for
reform along this tine, so successfu11y pursued in England and Canada, wi11
gain enormous force and prestige, and it wi11 ·very likely become the dom-.
inant system among our States. But more than that may confidently be
expected. An effective system of court rules wi11 be put into operation in
the federal courts sitting in each State, and that system will undoubtedly
tend to become the model for the systems which may be looked for in the
several States. The merit of the federal Supreme Court rules ought to be
enough !o commend them genera11y, but the great additional advantage to
accrue from identity of procedure in the State and federal courts will exert
a sti11 more powerful influence.
·
Procedure thus seems to enjoy a unique position in the United States.
It is the only subject of legislation over which the federal authorities have
fu11 coordinate jurisdiction with the States, and it offers the only opportunity for a federal system to serve as a model for State adoption. So that
procedure, which has lagged so long and suffered so many vicissitudes, bids
fair to become one of the pioneers of uniformity.
E. R. S.
WHAT WoRDs CRSA'rr: A Pown?-As the right to sell may exist either
as.,.a result of ownership, or by virtue of a power without or independent
of ownership, it is sometimes a question whether words indicating a right
to se11, contained in an instrument granting an estate, are intended to give
a.power, or are merely descriptive of the rights incident to the estate given.

NOTE AND COMMENT
When property is devised without any designation of the estate given, and
the devise is followed by words indicating that the devisee is to have the
right of absolute disposal in fee, or to sell in fee, it has often been held
that the words indicating an absolute power of disposal show that the
devisee was intended by the testator to have an estate in fee, not a life
estate with a testamentary power of appointing the reversion. (See note 18
L. R. A. N. S. 463.) If the devise were e..'Cpressly of an estate for life, no
such inference could be indulged; and it would have to be held that the
right of disposal given was merely a testamentary power to appoint the reversion.
Again, it has happened that testators have given estates expressly for
life only, with vague words as to the right of disposal, putting the court
into a quandary as to whether the testator was speaking of a testamentary
power or of the right of disposal incidental to ownership of a, life estate.
Thus in the case of Bradly v. Westcott (18o7), 13 Ves. 445, it was held
by Sir WM. GRANT, M. R., that the following words indicated not a testamentary power in addition to the life estate, but merely freedom from bond
and accountability for use: After minor bequests and direction to pay debts,
the testator gave all his moneys, stocks, household goods, and other personal
property to his wife, Elizabeth, "for and during the term of her natural
life; to be at her full, free, and absolute disposal and disposition during her
natural life, without being in any wise liable to be called to account of or
concerning the amount, value, or particulars thereof, by· any person or persons whomsoever; and from and after her decease" he gave what she should
be possessed of at the time of her death to others. Many cases of this sort
are to be found in the books.
A similar conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co. (1876), 93 U. S.
326, on , the following words : "I give and bequeath to my beloved wife,
Nancy Sinclair, all my estate, both real and personal, to have and to hold
during her natural life, and to do with as she sees proper before her death."
But in rendering the opinion, Mr. Justice FlllLD, after reviewing Bradly v.
Westcott, and similar cases, declared: "Numerous other cases to the same
purport might be cited. They all show, that where a power of disposal accompanies a bequest or devise of a life-estate, the power is limited to such
disposition as a tenant for liJe can make, unless there are other words
clearly indicating that a larger power was intended." In other words, that
a power of disposal given to a life tenant is no power at all, unless the
words used indicate that the life-tenant was to have greater powers of disposal ·over the property than a life estate gives. With deference to this
great judge, it is submitted that the cases cited show nothing of the sort.
It may be true that the fact that the person claiming the power is by the same
instrument given an estate, from which a certain right of disposal results,
may require clearer words to create a power to him than if no estate were
given him. But the books are full of cases in which an estate e..'Cpressly
for life, with power of sale or disposal, have been held to give power to
sell in fee, indeed, that is the only rational as well as the usual construe-
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·tion.1 Powers to life tenants have often been implied merely from gift over
of "what remains.""
•Lewis v. Palmer (1878), 46 Conn. 454, was a devise to a sister "during her natural
life, and for her to dispose of as she may think proper, right or just; and I do hereby
give power and authority to my executrix to sell real or personal property as she may
think best to make my estate clear from debt." Who was executrix does not appear,
nor that the life tenant sold to pay debts; but the court after discussing several cases
as to construction of powers of disposal to life tenants held that the right to sell in
fee was to be presumed.
In Bouton v. Doty (1897), 6g Conn. 531, 39 Atl. 1064, a power to mortgage the
fee was held to be included in a reservation by deed to the grantor of a life estate
"with full power to mortgage said premises to raise money for my own personal bene·
fit at any time I may desire for and during my natural life." To the same effect is
Security Co. v. Pratt (1894), 65 Conn. 161.
Wood v. Owen (1910) 133 Ga. 751, 66 S. E. g.51 holds that a power to sell in
fee was given by a devise to a wife "without limitation or reserve, for her to do
as she thinks best" for herself and his children, "and I make Archa M. Wood equal
with the rest of my heirs.''
Simpkins v. Bales (1904), 123 Iowa 62, g8 N. W. 58<>, holds that title in fee simple
passed by the deed of the widow to whom testator devised property "to be used and
enjoyed and disposed of as seemeth the best to her, during her natural life or so long
as she remains'my widow," and after her death to his children.
Hamilton v. Hamilton (1910), 149 Iowa 321, 128 N. W. 380.
In Fink v. I,eisman (1896), 18 Ky. !,. Rep. 71<>, 38 S. W. 6, a power to sell in
fee was held given by a gift by will to testator's wife of all his "personal, mixed, and
real estate property during her lifetime, with full power and authority to sell property
if she sees proper.'' .
.
Bodfish v. Bodfish (1909), 105 Me. 166, 73 Atl. 1033, discusses the implication of a
power to sell in fee to the widow to whom the estate expressly fJr life was given in
the absence of any declaration that she might sell, holding there was no warrant for
such implication -on the facts. But such a power was found in Young v. Hillier (191>7),
103 Me. 17, 67 At!. 571.
Cummings v. Shaw (1871), 108 Mass, 159, holds that power to pass a fee was given
by a devise "for and during his natural, with right to dispose of the same.''
Woodbridge v. Jones (1903), 183 Mass. 553, 67 N. E. 879, was a devise and bequest of residue real and personal "to my wife during her life, to use and dispose of
the same as she may think proper, with remainder thereof on her decease, one-third
to the heirs of my brother," &c.; and the court held a power to sell in fee was given
the wife.
In Hoxie v. Finney (1888), 147 Mass. 616, 18 N. E. 593, a sale in fee reserving to
herself a life estate was held authorized by the words: "I do give and bequeath to her
the use and improvement of my whole estate, both real and personal, with liberty to
use and appropriate so much of the principal, in addition to the income as she may
deem necessary for her comfort and support ; and I authorize her to sell and dispose
of the whole or any part of my real and person estate at her discretion."
Gaven v. Allen (1889), lOO Mo. 293, 13 S. W. 501, was a devise and bequeath of
residue to a wife without words of limitation, making her and another executors, and
adding: "My will is that my said wife shall or will not dispose of my aforementioned
fee simple and leasehold property without the written consent to the same of my
brother"; and it was held she had a power to sell in fee.
Griffin v. Nicholas (1909), 224 Mo. 275, 123 S. W. 1063, was a devise to a wife
"to have and to hold and enjoy for and during her natural life, with full power to
make such disposal thereof as may be necessary for her own comfort and support";
an'a. the court held it was a power to sell in fee, saying: "The words conferring the
power wouid be idle if they only meant that she could' sell her life estate."
Parks v. Robinson (1905), 138 N. C. 26g, so S. E. 649, holds that the objection
that plaintiff could not convey title in fee according to the contract sued on was not
0
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well taken, plaintiff claiming under a devise by her husband "to my beloved wife,
Ann Parks, during her natural life and at her disposal"; and after reviewing several
cases the court mentioned Brant v. Virginia Coal Co., saying, "We arc of opinion
that the more reasonable view, certainly where there is no limitation over, is found in
the decisions of this and other courts which we have cited."
Bishop v. Remple (186o), II Ohio St. 277, was a decision that a power to sell in
fee was given by the words: "I give, devise, and bequeath to my beloved wife, Elizabeth,
all and singular my goods and property as may remain after all claims against my
estate are satisfied, with full power to have and to hold, to sell and convey the same
during the term of her natural life," and "after her death any moneys or effects of my
estate that may remain," etc.
Forsythe v. Forsythe (1884), 108 Pa. St. 129, was a devise of all property real and
personal to wife "during her natural life, with power to dispose of the same as she
may .think best"; and it was held that her absolute disposition by will was authorized.
Shields v. Netherland (1880), 13 Tenn. (5 I.ea) 193, was a devise of land to a
daughter and her husband "to dispose of as they may think proper," followed by a
codicil declaring, "it is not my intention to make the estate a fee simple" if the bus·
band survives; but they "shall have power during their joint lives, to dispose of the
lands devised to them, by deed executed by them jointly," etc.; and this was held
to be a power to sell in fee absolute.
White v. White (1849), 21 Vt. 250, holds that power to sell in fee was given by
a devise to the wife "to have at her disposal during her natural life or so long as
she remains my widow."
Englerth v. Keller (1901), 50 \V. Va. 266, 40 S. E. 468, was a devise of residue
after paying debts, to wife "to be enjoyed by her during her natural life, but if at
any time she may wish she shall be at liberty of selling a portion of the real estate
that she may think to her interest, and in that case her conveyance shall be valid";
and the court after reviewing the decisions declared that a power to a life tenant to
sell, means in fee, wherefore her deed in fee was good.
Wood v. Amidon (1875), 2 MacArthur (D. C.) 224, holding a life estate and
power to sell in fee passed by devise to wife for life, she to pay debts, raise children,
and to give them portions on becoming of age, and to do with the estate as she may
think best for herself and the children.
Schreiner v. Smith (1889), as Fed. 897, was a devise of all property real and per·
sonal to a wife, "to have and to hold during her natural life unless she marry. • • •
The personal estate, before such marriage she may dispose of as ber necessities may
-require." This was held to enable the widow to dispose of the personal property abso·
lutely without liability to account for the proceeds.
2 A gift of "what may remain" after the death of the life tenant does not imply
a power in the life tenant if any of the property given is perishable or liable to di·
minish by use: Bramell v. Cole (1896), 136 Mo. 201, 31 S. \V. 924, 58 Am. St. 619;
Thompson v. Adams (1903), 205 !IL 552, 6g N. E. 1; Hunter v. Hunter (1900), 58
S. C. 382, 36 S. E. 734, 79 Am. St. 845; Herring v. Williams (19n), 158 N. C. 1, 73
S. E. 218, reviewing numerous cases.
In Clark v. Middlesworth ( 1882), 82 Ind. 240, a power to sell in fee was held
implied by a devise to testator's wife "during her life, and at her death if anything
should remain, the same to be divided among my heirs·at·law.!' Approved in Downie
v. Buennagel (1883), 94 Ind. 228, 234; Cushman's Estate (1890), 134 Ill. 88, 24 N. E.
963; Foudray v. Foudray (1909), 44 Ind. App. 444, 89 N. E. 499.
To the same effect: Harris v. Knapp (1839), 39 Mass. (21 Pick.), 412; Ramsdell v.
Ramsdell (1842), 21 Me. 288.
\Venger v. Thompson (1905), 128 Iowa 750, 105 N. \V. 333, holds a gift to wife
for her own use for life and to educate and maintain his children, and after her death
all the property then remaining in her possession, or the proceeds to be divided, gives
her a power to sell in fee.
Young v. Hillier (1907), 103 Me. 17, 67 At!. 571, holds that a gift over of what
may remain on the death of the tenant for life, implied such a power in the life tenant
.as enabled her to sell in fee whereby the remainder was defeated.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
That Mr. Justice Fnir.n's doctrine has no acceptance in the older cases and
is unknown in England, is vouched from never noticing it in a considerable
reading, failure to discover it by careful search of texts that should mention such a doctrine if there be one, and by the very explicit recognition of
the opposite and more sensible rule, as illustrated in the case of Vivian v.
Jegon (1868), L. R. 3 House of Lords Rep. 285. In this case the testator
gave certain property to trustees to pay debts, &c., and other real estate
to his daughter during the ter~ of her life without impeachment for waste,
declaring "it sha11 be lawful for my said daughter to work, or contract for,
lease, or .set out to be worked" mines then known or later discovered, the
net proceeds therefrom to be paid to the trustees and invested, the income
to be paid to the daughter for life. The daughter ma4e a mining lease for
tweµty-one years and died a few months later. For the lessee it was argued:
"It could not have been intended to be restricted to the granting of a lease
for life. That would be contrary to the practice of law and the object of the
testator. A gift of an estate for life carries with it the power to make
a lease for life, and the addition to the gift of the estate of a power of leasing, if intended to be restricted in this way would be perfectly needless, for
every tenant for life may aliene the estate for his own life. When, therefore, the power is added to the gift of the estate, the fair construction is
that the power is something different from and in excess of that which would
·have arisen as a mere accessory to the gift of an estate for life. Hele v.
Green (1651), 2 Roll. Abr. 261, pl. 10, expressly recognized the principle, and
declared that where there was a general power to a tenant for life to grant a
term, the grant of a term beyond this life was good, though it might defeat the remainders over." In rendering his opinion in the case, Lord
Chance11or CAIRNS said in part: ''It is quite obvious that the power to the
daughter to work the mines is a powet which cannot be exercised after her
death. It must be ~ power co-extensive with- her own life. It would ~e
somewhat singular, therefore, to find that one of the verbs here used should
point to a benefit terminating so far as the daughter is concerned with her
life; whereas another, the verb 'lease' should extend beyond her life to an
indefinite period of time. But beyond these observations, I think there are
in the latter part of this sentence, matters which indicate, beyond all doubt
that what was here provided for was to take place in the lifetime of the
daughter. The circumstances which, to my mind, are quite conclusive, are
these: In the first place there is the provision that 'all the issues and neat
proceeds and profits arising therefrom shall from time to time, as the same
sha11 arise, be paid over by my said daughter to my said trustees and their
heirs.' * * * And the only force, in fact which I myself felt in the argument of the appellant at your Lordship's bar, was this: It was contended·
that if you give an estate to A for life, and then give a general undefined
power of leasing to A, inasmuch as the gift of the life estate would carry
wi.th it a power of leasing limited to the life of the tenant for life, the donee
of the power; therefore, it was said it must be a necessary inference that in
giving to the tenant for life. a power to lease, a lease was meant going beY,ond the life incumbency." Lord CRANWORTH fotlowed, saying in part: "My
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Lords, I entirely concur in what my noble and learned friend has said, and
I have very tittle to add. Had this power been simply a power to lease
and work the mines there would have been (as my noble and learned friend
has suggested) great force in the argument that something must have been
intended more than the daughter would have had by virtue of her life interest. But that is not the object of this power. It is not so much a power
as a restriction. What the testator says is this: If by virtue of your life
interest you work these mines, mind I do not mean that you are to have
the profits; whatever you get by so doing must be invested for the benefit
of the fee simple of the estate. I think this is clearly what was meant.
Without going the length of saying that, if the power of leasing the mines
had been given simpliciter, without saying for how long, no case could
arise in which you might say that it meant for ninety-nine years, at all
events it must be an extreme case to enable you to come to such a result,
and put such a construction on the words. But there is no necessity at all for
it her-e."
Nevertheless, this dictum of Mr. Justice FIEI.D, wholly uncalled for by
the facts of the case before the court, has in a number of later cases been
accepted and acted on where the application of such a rule defeated the
clearly expressed intention of the testator, illustrating how unnecessary dicta
often produce bad law. The dictum is quoted in the following cases: Giles
v. Little (1881), 104 U. S. 291, holding "to be and remain hers, with full
power, right, and authority to dispose of the same as to her shall seem
meet and proper so l~ng as she shall remain" my widow," did not give a
•This doctrine is recognized in Kaufman v. Bredkenridge (1886), II7 Ill. 305,
7 N. E. 666, but power to sell in fee was found in the context: 'Dickinson v. Griggs·
ville Nat. Bk., III Ill. App. I83, affirmed, 209 IIL 350; Wardner v. Seventh Day
Baptist, etc. (I908), 232 Ill. 606, 83 N. E. Io8o, I22 Am. St. I38.
Smith v. Bell (I832), 3I U. S. (6 Peters) 68, cited and relied on by Mr. Justice
Field in Brant v. Virginia Coal Co., and from which he probably got the idea stated
in his proposition was a bequest of all personal estate, principally five slaves, to a
wife "to and for her own use and disposal absolutely; the remainder after her decease
to be for the use" of an only son. The only question discussed was whether the gift
over to the son was void as repugnant to the absolute gift to the wife. No idea of a
power was suggested: Marshall, C. J., in giving the opinion of the court said: "There
were trifling and perishable articles, such as the stock on the farm, and the crops
of the year, which would be consumed in the use, and over which the exercise of
absolute ownership was necessary to a full enjoyment. These may have been •in the
mind of the testator, when he employed the strong words of the bequest to her. But
be that as it may, we think the limitation to the son on the death of the wife restrains
and limits the preceding words so as to confine the absolute power of disposition
which they purport to confer of the slaves, to such a disposition of them as may be
made by a person having only a life estate."
Smith v. Mcintyre (I899), 95 Fed. 585, 37 C. C. A. 177, 'fi'as a devise of the
homestead to the wife for life in lieu of dower, and the personalty to the wife for life,
"she, however, first disposing of sufficient thereof to pay my just debts"; and it was
held the power was not confined to the personalty; and that she could sell the home
in fee.
Cowell v. South Denver Real Est. Co. (1901), 16 Col. App. n8, 63 Pac. 994,
merely holds that an explicit power to convey in fee given to the widow made tenant
for life and executrix was not well exercised bedluse no purpose of the will required
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pow.er to the widow; Henderson v. Blackburn (I882), I04 !ii. 227, 44 Am.
Rep. 78o, holding "to have and to hold or to dispose of so much of the same
as she may need or wish to use during her life time" and "after her death
if there is anything left" gave her no power beyond her express life estat~;
Patty v. Goolsby (I888), SI Ark. 6I, 9 S. W. &¢,holding the power extended
only to the personal property, under the gift of "all my negroes, lands, stock"
( &c.) "to have and to hold during her natural life, or until she may think
proper to marry, :with full power to sell and dispose of such property as she
may think proper"; Miller v. Porterfield (I8go), 86 Va. 876, II S. E. 486,
I9 Am. St. 9I9, holding that no power was given by the words "to have
and to hold the same for her own use and ibenefit, and also to make such
disposition of the same that she in her judgment may deem best, should it
become necessary that a part or all should become necessary for the support
of herself," and "After the death of the said Elizabeth, I wt11 and devise that
any and all property remaining unused shall be given" &c.; and now comes
the Supreme Court of South Carolina to add to the list of fatalities created
by this dictum by deciding, after quoting it as above, and without even mentioning numerous prior decisions of the South Carolina court, including
Franty v. Franty (I833), I Bailey Eq. 5I7, to the contrary on like facts, that
no power is given by the words: 'IMy wife, Jane, to have the right to dispose of any property as she may think best for the purpose of paying all
just debts and supporting herself and children while she remains my widow'';
and this merely because a previous clause of the will gave her a life estate
in all his property. Sheffield v. Graig (I9I6), - S. C. -, 8g S. E. 664
'
J.R R
WHAT 0BI.IGATIONS Alls !NCI.UDE!> IN TH:e D£SCRII'TION 011' "IMPLIED CoN-

question arose in the case of People v. Dummer, u3
N. W. 934 recently decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois. The state
had brought suit in debt in the Municipal Court of Chicago against the defendant for taxes alleged to be due from him. By statute the municipal
court was given jurisdiction over all actions on contracts, express or im-

TRAC'l'S ?''-This

it (payment of debts or the like), but the court does cite the case of Brant v. Virginia
Coal Co. with apparent approval.
Whittemore v. Russell (1888), So Me. 297, 14 Atl. 197, holds that a power is not
given Qnyone by the following words because it is not said who shall sell: "I give
to my wife the use of the remainder * * • during her natural lifetime, and after
her decease it is to be equally divided between my children; the real estate may be
sold if thought advisable."
Russell v. Werntz (1898), 88 Md. 210, 44 Atl. 219, sheds no light on the present
discussion because the court and counsel discussed only the question as to whether the
devisee took an estate in fee by a devise to her "to hold and dispose of as he may
see fit while she remains single." But very strict interpretation of language giving
powers in this state is indicated in the later case of Bauernschmidt's Est. (1903), 97
Md. 35, 54 Atl. 637, and Meister v. Meister (1913), 121 Md. 440, 88 Atl. 225.
''Winchester v. Hoover (1902), 42 Ore. 313, 70 Pac. 1036, contatns no power to the
life tenant; it is "to have and to hold during her life, or while she shall remain unmar·
ried, to pay my debts, to support herself, and to maintain and educate minor children";
but the court does quote and approve the dictum of,Mr. Justice Field above quoted. '
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plied, when the amount claimed by the plaintiff, exclusive of costs, exceeded $1,000.00. Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on the ground
that the court had no jurisdiction, inasmuch as the cause of action was
deemed not to ·be based on a contract express or implied.
It is plain that if the court was entitled to jurisdiction over the case, it
was for the reason that the cause of action was based on implied contract, for it could hardly be said that the obligation to pay a tax arises out
of an express contract. It is also clear that the contract, if implied' at all1
must have been implied in law and not in fact, for there were no acts or
words of the taxpayer from which an actual intention to pay could have
been presumed. The intention of the legislature must govern in determining what is included in the term "implied contract." That intention can be
gathered by considering· what is generally meant by the term as used by
writers and courts. Does it mean a contract in fact, that is, one based on
consent implied from words or acts, or doe5 it include, in addition to the
above, all non-contractual obligations which are treated for the· purpose
of affording a. remedy as if they were contracts? Or does the term include, besides contracts in fact, only that group of non-contractual obligations founded on "unjust enrichment," technically called quasi-contracts?
On the precise point involved in the suit for taxes in the principal case,
there seems to have been little, if any, adjudication. However, some light
may be thrown on the problem by considering the same question as it has
arisen in connection with the jurisdiction of the United States Court of
Claims. By the Act of Congress of February, 1855, that court was given
jurisdiction over "* * * all claims founded * * * upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States * * * " It has
been held quite precisely that the "implied contract" of the statute includes
only those in fact, that is, those implied from ,the acts or words of the
parties, the mutual consent being presumed from conduct rather than expressed. Schillinget"s Case, 24 C. C. Rep. 278; Russell v. United States, 35
C. C. Rep. 154; Harley v. United States, 39 C. C. Rep. 105; Knapp v. United
States, 46 C. C. Rep. 6or. These decisions hold conclusively that "implied
contract" does not includ'e contracts implied in law, that is, neither quasicontracts nor any other obligations which are contractual only from the
viewpoint of the remedy available for their enforcement.
The preceding discussion would seem to support absolutely the ruling in
the principal case but for one consideration. The Illinois court in interpreting the statute, stated that the term in question had been extended to include "a class of obligations which are created by law without regard to the
assent of the party upon whom the obligation is imposed, on the ground that
they are dictated by reason and justice." Yet the court refused to extend
it to the case of an obligation to pay a tax. The term as defined so as to
include quasi-contracts in the narrow sense, that is, "unjust enrichment"
cases, is supported by authorities. Chudnovski v. Eckels, 232 Ill. 3r2; Harty
Bros. v. Polakow, 237 Ill. 559;. Pache v. Oppenheim, 87 N. Y. Supp. 704;
Devery v. Winton Motor Carriage Co., 97 N. Y. Supp. 392. Two things are
of interest in connection with the Illinois cases, cited supra, allowing this
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form of jurisdiction over quasi-contracts. In Chudnovski v. Eckels, the court
quotes Br.ACKSTON:£, 3 CoMM. 158, to show that the term "implied contract"
includes what is called a contract implied in law. However, the court seems
to have overlooked the fact that the learned writer in that very portion
of his work included a tax in the same category, as is evidenced by the fact
that he used a statutory obligation as one ~mple of implied contract. In
the case of Harty Bros. v. Polakow, the action was based on a statutory lien,
a mere duty or obligation, as it were, and jurisdiction was taken with implied contract as the basis. Several well considered cases outside of Illinois
have held that a tax is an obligation based on an implied contract. State of
Nevada v. Y. J.M. Co., 14 Nev. 220; City of Dubuque v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.,
39 Iowa 56.
It is evident, then, that the Illinois court defines "implied contract" as
more extensive than contract implied in fact, but not so extensive as to include all non-contractual obligations termed contract for the sake of the
remedy only. Why should there be a middle course? "The term 'quasicontracts' may with propriety be applied to all non..contractual obligations
which are treated for the purpose of affording a remedy as if they were
contracts. So interpreted, the subject includes: cl) judgments and other
so-called contracts of record; (2) ~ number of official and.statJltory obligations * * * ; (3) .obligations arising from 'unjust enrichment,'-that is, the
receipt by one person from another of a benefit the retention of which is
unjust. But in view of the fact that nearly all of the obligations included
in the first two classes are co~monly known and treated under more specifi~
designations, or as parts of other clearly defined topics, while those of the
third class have no other distinctive name whatever, it is believed that the
term 'quasi-contracts,' for the sake of convenience, should ordinarily be applied to obligations of the tli,ird class only." WOODWARD, LAw OF QuAs1-CoN'l'RAC'tS, I. There is a great deal to be said in making the criterion of jurisdiction one of remedy or form rather than one of substance, for then a
court can determine whether it has jurisdiction by merely examining the
most general pleadings. And this in spite of the position taken by the United
States Court of Claims. However, there can ·be little justification for taking jurisdiction over one obligation which is contractual only for remedy's
sake, and refusing to take Jurisdiction over another similar non-contractual
obligation which can be enforced by a contractual remedy. The Illinois
court, in order to be thoroughly consistent with its rulings in preVious cases,
which carried jurisdiction over contracts into the realm of quasi-contractual
obligations, should have held that the Chicago Municipal Court had jurisdiction of the cause of action in the principal case.
H. G. G.

CoNsTITuTioNAI, A11u~NDM:£NTS, SaF-ExtcuTING AND OTRERWist, PBOFOR TR~ INITIATIVt AND ~tRtNDUM.-The question of whether or
n~f a provision of a state constitution, which provided that amendments
thereto might be made by initiative petition, was self-ex~cuting, was presented to the Supreme Court of North Dakota in the recent case of State
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ex rt?l. Linde, Atty. Gen. et al. v. Hall, Secretary of State, 1S9 N. W. 281.
'North Dakota, at the -same time it adopted the initiative for constitutional
amendments, also changed its constitution so as to permit of the initiative
and referendum upon questions of general legislation; but the constitutional
provision pertaining to this expressly stated that it was intended to be selfexecuting and thus the question here presented did not arise in the construction of the amendment pertaining to the iI!itiative and referendum upon
general legislation. Oregon, Oklahoma, Missouri, Arkansas, Washington,
California, Colorado, Arizona, South Dakota, New Mexico, and Nevada have
also at different times provided for the initiative and referendum through
constitutional provisions. Of these constitutional provisions, some were
clearly stated to be self-executing; whlte others were so worded as to make
it evident that it was not intended that they should be self-executing, but
rather that they should be construed as mandates to the legislatilres of the
respective states, who, acting thereunder, should pass laws effectuating and
putting into force the principles thus set forth. However, there is a third
class, of which Hall v. State is typical, wherein the constitutio~al provision
was so worded as to throw doubt upon its purpose and render a judicial
determination necessary.
A terse way of -summing up the distinction between self-executing provisions and those which are not, is·to say that self-executing proyisions are
addressed to the courts while those that are not are addressed to the legislatures. Willis v. Mabon, 48 Minn. 140, so N. W. IIIO, 16 L. R. A. :281, 31
Am. St. Rep. 626; State v. Kyle, 166 Mo. 287, 6S S. W. 763, s6 L. R. A. us.
Constitutional provisions are "self-executing where it is the manifest intention that they should: go into effect and no ancillary legislation is necessary
to the enjoyment of a right given or the enforcement of a duty or liability
imposed." State v. Harris, 74 Ore. S73, 144 Pac. 109; State v. Swan, l N. D.
s, 13, 44 N. W. 492. In other :words, the constitutional provision must ~e
regarded as self-executing if an examination and construction of the provision itself will disclose the rights conferred or the duties imposed. However, if merely general principles are laid down, and the legislature must
supplement the constitutional provision by passing laws to effectuate its
purpose, then it is not self-executing.
Oregon in 1902 amended its constitution so as to permit the initiative and
referendum, providing for a general reservation by the people of the power
to propose laws and amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject
the same at the polts, and also the power to approve or reject at the polls
any act of the legislative ·assembly. It not being evident whether or not
the amendment was intended to be self-executing, the court was calted upon
to construe the following portion: "Petitions and orders for the initiative
and referendum shall be filed with the Secretary of State, and in submitting
the same to the people he, and all other officers, shall be guided by the general laws and the act submitting this amendment until legislation shalt be
especialty provided for." The court construed the provision to be selfexecuting, considering that the purpose was to insure the enforcement of
the provision through its own strength and not to make its efficacy depend-
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ent upon some :future action on the part of the legislature, lest its effect
be thwarted by the refusal by the legislature to obey its mandates. The
court considered that the reference to future legislation was an acknowledgment that it might be advisable to enact laws to facilitate the enforcement of this constitutional provision, but that a provision may still ·be selfexecuting though not so complete as to render supplemental legislation unnecessary. Stevens v. Benson, 50 Ore. 26g, 91 Pac. 577. The initiative and
referendum were still further extended in Oregon by a constitutional provision which provided for the initiative and referendum as to municipal legislation, the amendment reading that "the manner of exercising said powers
shall be prescribed by general laws." In construing this amendment, the
court came to the opinion that it was not self-executing, as "it only declares
or reserves the right, without laying down rules by means of which this right
may be given the force of law." Long v. City of Portland, 53 Ore. 92, g8
Pac. 149.
The Oklahoma provision as to the initiative and referendum had provided that "the legislature shall make suitable provisions for carrying into
effect the provisions of this article." The court had no difficulty in determining that the intention of the constitutional convention had been that this
should be construed only as a mandate to the Legislature, and· giving effect to this intention, it was declared not to be self-executing. E~ parte
Wagner, 21 Okla. 33, 95 Pac. 435.
The provision .in the Missouri constitution was very similar to that one
discussed in Stevens v. Benson, 50 Ore. 26g, supra, and the Missouri court
assumed the same to be self-executing. Edwards v. Lesueur, 132 Mo. 410,
31 L. R. A. 815. The Arkansas provision upon the subject was borrowed
from the Oregon constitution, and the Oregon court in Stevens v. Benson,
supra, having deter1pined the same to be self-executing, the Arkansas court
did likewise, (State v. Moore, 103 Ark. 48, 145 S. W. 199) doubtless having
regard for the general rule that where one state borrows a constitutional
provision from another state that has previously been construed by the courts
of such state, such construction is presumed to be adopted along with the
provision. McGrew v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 231 Mo. 4g6, 132 S. W. 1077•
.The Colorado provision is very similar to the one adopted in Oregon.
However, it does not expressly state that it is intended to be self-executing,
nor does it make reference to :future legislation as indicating tpat it was
not presumed to be self-executing. It provides the percentage of voters
necessary to propose a measure, to whom the petition should· be addressed,
the time previous to election within which it must be filed, and that a majority vote is sufficient to enact the petition into law. It appears that the
court has construed this to be self-executing by upholding a constitutional
amendment which was initiated and passed by force of this constitutional
provision. The court stated: "Whenever-a constitutional amendment is attacked because of alleged violation of the Constitution in its submission, it
mtl!;t appear beyond a reasonable doubt, both as to law and fact, that the
Constitutio~ has •been violated before the amendment would be overthrown."
People v. Prevost, 55 Colo. 199, 134 Pac. 129.
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The provisions in the constitutions of Nevada, California, South· Dakota,
and New Mexico will need no attention in this connection, as the former
two state expressly that they are intended to be self-eJtecuting, while the lat•
ter two clearly indicate that they were'not expected to be self-executing.
As previously stated, North Dakota bas provided for the initiative and
referendum upon general legislation by a constitutional amendment which
had affirmatively provid'ed that the same was to be self-executing. This provision was proposed and P,assed by the 19n legislature and again passed by
the I9I3 legislature (Senate bitt No. 32, chapter IOI, 19I3 Session Laws),
and having been ratified by a vote of the peopl~. it became incorporated as
a part of the constitution. The constitutional provision construed in the
case of State v. Hall, supra, granted the privilege of amending the constitution through initiative petition. This constitutional amendment .was adopted
through much the·· same procedure as that followed in changing the constitution so as to· permit the initiative and referendum upon general legislatio.n.
It was introduced and passed by the 19n legislature (Senate Bill I53, chapter
89, Session Laws I9II), and having been ratified by a vote of the people,
this provision permitting the constitution to be amended through initiative
petition jiad now become a part of th~ state constitution (§202) •.A petition
fulfitling the requisites so far as set forth in the constitutional amendment
was now filed with the Secretary of State which sought to amend §215 of
the state constitution so as to remove t.he capitol from Bismarck to New
Rockford. Relators insisted that the petition was void, inasmuch as the
constitutional amendment under which petitie>rters were proceeding was
not setf;executing and no supplemental legislation had been passed thereunder to put the same into effect. Therefore, they sought to enjoin the
Secretary of State from submitting the question contained in the petition
to a vote of the people. That part of the constitutional amendment which
bore upon the question of whether or not the same was self-executing (subdivision 2, -§202) read as follo~s :
"Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may also ~e proposed by the people by the filing with the Secretary of State, at least six
months previous to a general election, of an initiative petition containing the
signatures of at least twenty-five per cent of the legal voters in each of not
less than one-half of the counties of the state. When such petition has been
properly filed, the proposed amendment or a~endments shall be published
as the Legislature may provide, for three months previous to the general
election, and shatl be placed upon the ballot to be voted upon by the people
at the next general election."
The court construed the phrase "as the Legislature may provide" to be
indicative of future legislatie>n as to the manner of publishing the proposed
amendment, but inasmuch as there was a general provision in force as to
the manner in which proposed constitutional amendments should be given publicity (§979 of Political Code of 19I3) it was argued that this phrase, "as
the Legislature may provide," referred to the method already in use for advertising proposed constitutional amendments. Surely the omission to state
expressly the manner of publication would not have in itself defeated the
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self-execution of the amendment. The court, not finding it evident from an
examination of the amendment itself.that the same was self-executing or the
contrary, proceeded to determine the question from the intention of the
framers, and to determine that intention a resort to extrinsic matters was
found necessary. .Fuss v. Spaunhorst, 67 Mo. 256.
It was disco"'.ered that the wording of the constitutional provision in question was taken from the section bearing on the same subject in the Oregon
constitution, the similarity of the language employed indicating that one was
patterned after the other. However, the North Dakota legislature failed to
adopt the last clause of the Oregon provision, "Petitions ·and orders for the
initiative and referendum shall be filed with the Secretary of State, and
in submitting the same to the people he, and all other officers, shall 1be. guided
by the general laws and the act submitting this amendment until legislation
is especially provided for." As the Oregon courts, previous to the adoption
by North Dakota of the former state's constitutional provision on the question of amendment of constitution by initiative petition, had decided: that
the insertion of this particular clause determined the constitutional amendment to be self-executing (Stevens v. Benson, supra), then it would seem,
from the fact that the North Dakota. legislature had in its adoption· eliminated
this .clause, that the legislature did not intend that the amendment which
it was framing was to be considered self-executing. McG-rew v. Mo-. Pde.
R. Co., 230 Mo. 4g6, 132 S. W. 1077 \,Fitzmaurice v. Willis, ~ N. D. 372, 127
N. W. 95; Commonwealth v. Harnett, 3 Gray (Mass.) 450; Pen11ock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1;7 L. Ed. 327; Hogg v. Emerson, 6 How. ;182, 12 L."Ed. 505,
Inasmuch as the court will .look to the words of the constitutional amendment itself for a determination of whether or not the same is 13elf-executing,
why would it not be wise for the Legislature to insert in every such provision some clause indicating the intent? "This section shall be self-execut.ing," or, if 'it is thought necessary, add, "but legislation may be enacted especially to facilitate. its operation." On the other Jiand, .if it is the intention·
that the amendment should not be construed as self-executing, let a clause
be inserted which would clearly irtd unequivocally state that the same was
not self-executing, or plainly indicate that it was to be considered only as
a mandate to succeeding legislatures,-"The Legislature shall make suitable
provisions for carryi11g into eff~ct the provisions of this amendment." Let
some express provision be inserted wherever there is the slightest" possibility
of the question arising. Those who frame the law can best state whether or
not it" is intended to be full and complete in itself, or merely an outline of
a general policy for the guidance of future legislation. To neglect to insert
sonie such clause will often give rise to the necessity of a judicial determination of the question,_:a possibility which may not occur to the framer of
the amendment because of his own familiarity with its intention. Not only
ai:~ cost and _delay saved, but also the disappointment of those who have relie'd1· on a construction of the provision opposite to that determined upon
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WH~N Is DEATH INSTANTANJWUS ?-The existence, side by side, in the
same jurisdiction at the same time of the two .statutes which have come to
be generally known as the "DEATH ACT!' (modelled after LoRD CAYPBi::r.r.'s
Ac::r), and the "SURVIVAL Ac::r," has led to many curious twists and turns of
the law and has resulted in a decided co.nflict of authority as to their proper
interpretation. It would almost seem· as if the cases were in conflict upon
every point upon which there could possibly be a difference of opinion. It
is even difficult to reconcile some of the cases d'ecided by the same court.
For the different interpretations which have been given these statutes and
the resulting conflict in authority see 15'HARV. L. lh:v. 854, 14 MICH. L. IU:V.
4o8, and for a full discussion of the Michigan cases an article on "CoNsnuc'.rION OF 'SURVIVAL ACT! AND 'DEATH ACT! IN MICHIGAN'' in 9 MICH. L. lh:v.

205.

.

Upon one poinf·the cases are fairly well agreed, that when aeath is "in'stantaneous" there can be but one recovery and that under the "DEATH ACT."
Therefore, as pointed out in the note in 14 MICH. L. lh:v. 4o8, the question
whether or not death is "instantaneous" is a vital one, and out of the decisions on that point there has sprung one of the most serious conflicts of
the whole question, viz: when is death instantaneous? ·The iriquiiy in this
note will concern only that particular phase of the general question. ·
In the recent case of Great Northern. Railway Co. v. Capital Trust Co.,
Adms., 37 Sup. Ct. 41, the Supreme Court of the UJ,tited States was called
upon to pass upon the point under discussion. An employee of the railway company was accidentally. killed and suit was brought under the Federal
EMPLOn:R's LIABILITY,AC'l' for the benefit of his father and mother seeking
to recover their pecuniary loss and also damages suffered by him prior to
·his death. Some evidence tended to show that after bemg run o:ver by one
or more cars, although wholly unconscious, the deceased continued to breathe
for perhaps ten minutes. .Testimony of other witnesses suppoi:ted a claim
that there was no appreciable continuation of life. The court held that death
1
was instantaneous and that the circumstances afforded no. basis for an estimation or award of damages in addition -to the •beneficiaries' pecuniary loss.,
1n a former case, St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 35
Sup. Ct. 704. 59 L. Ed. u6o, the Supreme Court held that as the decendent
had· survived his injuries more than a half hour, the injuries being such· as
to cause him extreme pain and suffering if he remained conscious, the administrator might recover the .beneficiary's pecuniary loss and also for the
pain and suffering endured by the deceased. That is, death was not instantaneous, and a cause of action had vested in the injured· employee which
survived to his personal representative. In that case the rule· was stated as
follows : "Such pain and suffering as are substantially contemporaneous with
death or mere incidents to it, as also the short periods of insensibility which
sometimes intervene between fatal injuries and death, afford no basis for a
separate estimatioq or award of damages under statutes like that which is
controlling here." The facts in Great Northern. Ry. Co. v. Capital Trust Co.,
supra, were deemed to bring it squarely within the rule as laid down in
St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Craft. Therefore we may safely say that we have
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a fairly, definite workable rule for guidance , in future cases arising under
the federal statute.
In Michigan the cases are confusing and fail to give a definite and certain
test as to when death is instantaneous. See 9 MrcH. L. Rsv. 205, 214 In
Olivier v. St.' Ry. Co., 134 Mich. 367, g6 N. W. 434 104 Am. St. Rep. 6o7,
3 Ann. Cas. 53, the court said : "There is no occasion for saying that one
dies instantly, because such survival is accompanied by a comatose condition,
or unconsciousness, or insanity or idiocy," and cited Keilow v. Railway Co.,
68 Iowa 470, "where it was held that survival of the injury for a moment is
sufficient to permit the cause of action to vest and survive.". 'However, in
the case of West v. Detroit United Railway Co., 159 Mich. 26g, 123 N. W.
i101, where decedent was struck by a street car, carried under the car and
crushed, and was heard to groan for about fifteen minutes after the accident,
though he was dead when taken from beneath the car, the court held that
death was instantaneous and laid down the following rule : ''Where there
is i continuing injury resulting in death within a few ·moments, it is 'instantaneous'." Fo11owing this came the case of Ely v. D. U. R., 162 Mich.
287, where the deceased· was struck on the: head by a trolley· pole and lived
about ten minutes, though never recovering consciousness, and it was held
that the action was properly• brought under the "SURVIVAr, Ac:r." A still
later Michigan case is Lobenstein v. Whitehead & Kales Iron Co., 179 Mich.
279, ·146 N. W. 293. In that case the deceased fell down a flue in a building
under construction, and never recovered consciousness after he struck, although there were some signs of life about the body fifteen minutes after
the fall, and it was held that death was instantaneous. For the latest Michigan case on the question see Beach v. St. l oseph, 158 N. W. 1045. This.
brief review of the Michigan cases alone serves to illustrate the confusion
in the authorities and the inherent difficulties of the problem.
The results in other jurisdictions are equally as unsatisfactory. In Moyer
v. Oshkosh, 151 Wis. 586, 139 N. W. 378, the decedent while riding a bicycle
fell through an open draw in ~ bridge and was, drowned. Death was held:
to be instantaneous, the court at the same time saying that the proper test is:
"Was there a substantial period of conscious suffering between the injury and
the death?" But evidently the court determined that there is no .conscious
suffering in death by drowning. It would al.most seem as if our common
knowledge would show this to be untrue, for it would be rare indeed where
the first contact with the water would result in instant death or unconsciousness. On the: contrary, would it not be more in accord with the circumstances 'generally accompanying such tragedies to say that while the deceased
was ·struggling in the water and drowning there was a substantial period of
conscious suffering? But see The Corsair, 145 U. S. 335; Clieatham v. Red
River Line, 56 Fed. 248. In Klann v. Minn, 161 Wis. 517, 154 N. W. 9¢; in
applying the rule the same court came to the conclusion that there was a
su~stantial pe!icid of conscious suffering where the decedent was caught and
burlied in a building in which he was working. In other word·s, the court
has decided that while the first flame which reached the deceased would not
cause instant death or unconsciousness, nevertheless such would be the re-
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sult from the first contact of the water in case of death by drowning. See
also Perkins v. 0.xford Paper Co., 104 Me. 109, 71 Atl. 476, where the same
rule is applied.
·
In Massachusetts we find still another variation of the rule. There the
accruing right of action to the person injured and· which will survive to his
personal representative does not depend upon intelligence, consciousness, or
mental capacity of any kind upon the part of the person injured. Holle~
beck v. Berkshire R. Co., 9 Cush. ~ass.) 478. In the earlier case of Kearney
v. Bost01i & W.R. Co., 9 Cush. lo8, it had been held ~Y Chief Justice SHAW
that where "there was only a momentary, spasmodic struggle" death was instantaneous. · See also Norton v. Sewall, lo6 Mass, 143; 8 Am. Rep. 298;
Mears v. Bosto1i & M. R. Co., 163 Mass. 150, 39 N. E. 997.· In a later Massachusetts case (Martin v. Boston & M. R. Co., 175 Mass. 502, 56 N. E. 719)
where a brakeman· in· descending from a train caught his foot. fell,' and was
dragged over two hundred feet before he was finally killed, the' court heid
that there was no conscious suffering and so death was instantaneous. In
St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Stamps, &i Ark. 241, 104 S. W. II4, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas on facts which indicated much more clearly that death
had been instant reached an exactly opposite conclusion. The Massachusetts
rule was applied in·the principal case under discussion, Great Northern Ry.
Co. v. Capital Trust Co., supra, when it was before the Supreme 'Court of
Minnesota (reported in 127 Minn. I44. 149 N. W. 14), and a different conclusion reached from that by the Supreme Court of the United States, viz:.
that death had been instantaneous.
,
.
. ,
Perhaps the rule announced by the Supreme Court will ·do much to Clarify
a problem which has been so troublesome. It will at least furnish a moreo
definite test for solving these perplexing situations than any of the rules
hitherto announced. •
M. C. M.

